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Abstract
We  report data from a revelatory qualitative case study of a failed attempt to
negotiate an international joint venture agreement.  We analyze issues of justice and the role
that their occurrence in the course of the negotiations might have played in this outcome.
These potential antecedents of the failure were derived from theories of organizational
justice. The results support an argument that organizational justice theory, particularly
interactional justice, can play an important role in explaining alliance negotiation outcomes. 
Keywords: strategic alliances; alliance negotiations; justice theory.THE ROLE OF JUSTICE THEORY
IN EXPLAINING ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS
In the literature dealing with strategic alliances such as international joint ventures
(IJV) there is a significant gap: evidence outlining the actual negotiation dynamics that take
place between the parties. What informal processes are at work in this stage of strategic
alliance evolution, and how they affect the outcomes of these negotiations, remains
something of a “black box”. Moreover, a conceptual basis for exploring these dynamics
–justice theory– has largely been ignored by those exploring the emergence of strategic
alliances. In addition, among scholars who rely on justice theory to explore organizational
phenomena an interesting debate has emerged about the relevance of interactional justice to
procedural justice.
A case study of an attempt to negotiate an IJV agreement by a Spanish firm with an
Argentine firm provides data for analyses of perceptions of fairness and their roles in
explaining the outcome of the negotiations1. Our objective is to develop new insights into this
important initial phase of the evolutionary dynamics of alliances. Our findings support an
argument that organizational justice theory plays a critical role in explaining negotiation
outcomes and that interactional justice is as important in understanding outcomes in this
context as procedural justice. 
A number of sound theoretical grounds exist for exploring the role of fairness in the
setting of alliance negotiations. Similarly, very practical reasons exist. For scholars, a better
understanding of the dynamics of negotiations can shed light on initial deal making (and
breaking) processes. The negotiations literature in general (e.g., Raiffa, 1982; Neale and
Northcraft, 1991; Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Brett, Northcraft and Pinkley, 1999), and that
stream of it used in exploring negotiations in alliance contexts (e.g., Gulati, Khanna and
Noria, 1994), tend to focus on actions that might improve the processes of negotiations (see,
e.g., Bazerman and Gillespie, 1999), but provide little empirical insight into why alliances
fail to get past the negotiation stage. In addition, many, if not most, of the studies of
organizational justice involve reliance on either laboratory experiments or surveys.
Importantly, use of these approaches somewhat limits the ability of researchers to apply the
results directly to the solution of problems that confront managers on a day-to-day basis.
Finally, the ability to explore theories of justice in a setting outside the laboratory, or without
1 Organizational justice scholars typically refer to justice in terms of people’s perceptions of fairness
(Greenberg, 1987). We follow this convention in this paper.
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We also wish to thank the individuals who made access to the data possible.relying on survey methodology, provides additional insight into the on-going debate among
some organizational scholars about the efficacy of distinguishing between procedural and
interactional justice (see, e.g., Bies and Moag, 1986; Cropanzano and Greenberg, 1997). 
Practically speaking, finding partners needed for an alliance and negotiating with
them entails the commitment of significant personal and organizational resources. In addition
to the direct costs that flow from negotiations (measured by money and managerial time),
opportunity costs (organizational and individual) must be considered. BATNAs no longer
may be attractive. Alternative partners (other than those associated with the BATNA) may no
longer be available. Failure may also have an adverse impact on the reputations of the firms
involved. Individual careers may be damaged. 
One reason why we do not have much insight on the role that justice theory plays in
alliance negotiation dynamics is that the literature that typically has been relied upon in
exploring alliances is not terribly useful in explaining this kind of issue. Much of the literature
on alliances is grounded in a number of economic theories (transaction cost economics,
agency theory, resource-based theories of the firm) that tend to focus on issues related to the
structure of an alliance, or on issues related to performance. Another reason is that relevant
kinds of data are difficult to access and the work involved in doing so is time consuming. 
We  begin the paper by reviewing literatures related to justice theory and alliance
processes. We then describe the research setting, and how our data were collected and analyzed,
followed by a discussion of our findings. The paper concludes with a discussion of the
implications of our findings for scholars and for managers contemplating strategic alliances.
Alliance Negotiations2
In this section we offer a very brief review of two theoretical perspectives and the
insights they provide on alliance negotiations: alliance processes and justice theories.3 The
former has made a major contribution to the alliance literature, but alliance researchers
largely have ignored the justice perspective and we begin our literature review by addressing
this stream of research.
Organizational Justice Perspectives4
Application of organizational justice theories to the study of strategic alliances, as we
have indicated, has been very limited.5 Leung et al. (1996) use organizational justice analysis
2
2 The literature on so-called strategic alliances is extensive (in excess of 2000 articles since 1995 in peer
reviewed journals) and a comprehensive review of it is not essential to our arguments. Readers not familiar
with the literature will find excellent reviews in Uzzi, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Powell et al., 1998; Das
and Bing-Sheng, 2002; Rosenkopf et al., 2002. 
3 We recognize, but do not employ, transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1988), agency theory
(Jensen and Mechling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), game theory (Parkhe, 1993), the resource based view
of the firm (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), real options theory (Kogut, 1991), resource dependence
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), and relational and structural embeddedness perspectives (Gulati, 1995, 1998) as
having contributed significantly to our understanding of alliance dynamics.
4 There is an enormous amount of conceptual and empirical work relying on justice theories. It is beyond the
scope of this article to do justice to that body of work in our review. We assume that many of the readers of
this article will be quite familiar with the work and the arguments underlying it. Our review is designed to
introduce justice theory to researchers who have focused primarily on alliance dynamics.
5 In the alliance literature we have been able to find only seven instances of published work relying on justice
theory (Kumar, 1996; Leung et al., 1996, 1997; Giacobbe-Miller, Miller, and Vistorov, 1997; Johnson, 1997,
1999; Johnson, Korsgaard, and Sapienza, 2002).to explain job satisfaction of local employees of joint venture hotels in China. Johnson (1997)
finds perceptions of procedural justice in strategic decision making have an influence on
several aspects of managers’ commitment to the joint venture. Despite the inter-organizational
context of these studies, the use of justice theory is from an intra-organizational perspective.
The authors in these and related studies were exploring dynamics within the joint venture, not
the dynamics between the partners nor the dynamics of the negotiations that led to the
formation of the joint venture. 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) were among the first to suggest that justice theory
might be employed to explain a variety of the processes associated with alliances. Ariño, de
la Torre and Ring (2001) take that argument one step further and advocate the application of
justice theory to understanding the dynamics of inter-partner relationships. They suggest that
procedural and interactional justice will have a stronger influence on the level of relational
quality between partners than distributive justice. But they do not shed any light on how
justice issues may influence alliance negotiations, other than suggesting that justice theories
might bring new insights into our understanding of the efficacy of sense-making,
understanding, and committing processes. 
Scholars relying on justice theory argue that individuals’ assessments of fairness are
derived from their perceptions of distributive justice (Are outcome allocations perceived as
being fair?), procedural justice (Are the procedures used to make allocations perceived as being
fair?), and interactional justice (Is interpersonal treatment accorded individuals during the
implementation of procedures perceived as being fair?). All three sets of perceptions appear to
be relevant to the dynamics that occur in the course of negotiating an IJV.
Homans (1961) and Adams (1965) were among the first to argue that justice theories
developed by philosophers and political scientists might be useful in understanding
organizational behavior and dynamics, focusing on distributive justice. Cropanzano (1993)
has asserted that within the framework of distributive justice theory, an individual’s
perceptions with regard to fairness are strongly influenced by the rules used to assess fairness
(e.g., need, equity, equality, etc.). A recurring theme in the literature on distributive justice is
the tension between efficiency, which requires directing resources to those who will use them
most productively, and equality, which requires subsidizing the less productive (Messick,
1993). One would expect to find evidence of such tensions in IJV negotiations, especially if
parties act (or are perceived to be acting) opportunistically.
Skarlicki and Folger (1997) found a three-way interaction among distributive,
procedural, and interactional justice in a study of retaliation: the three kinds of fairness do
not appear to be independent of each other in explaining retaliation. We might expect to find
evidence that these interactive effects vary over the course of negotiating an IJV. Moreover,
the likelihood of some form of retaliation for perceived unfairness in the course of a
negotiation seems reasonable and has a sound theoretical foundation (Axelrod, 1984). 
Studies of procedural justice initially were focused on the question of how
individuals perceived the fairness of the formal procedures used by their organizations that
affected the way they and others in the workplace were treated (Thibaut and Walker, 1975).
Early researchers paid more attention to issues related to structure (e.g., were employees
allowed to help make the rules that governed their work life?), than to what constituted
procedural justice. Levinthal (1980) was one of the first to actually explore how procedural
justice might be measured, employing variables such as accuracy, bias suppression,
consistency, ethicality, correctability and/or representativeness. 
3Folger and Greenberg (1985) were among the first to empirically test these
arguments in the work setting. Lind and Tyler (1988), strengthening this foundation, have
argued that it is important to look at how employees perceive the fairness of the procedures
used by their employers, independent of the outcomes produced by those procedures (and
perceptions of fairness regarding those outcomes). However, most of these studies have been
conducted at an individual level of analysis. Broader contexts such as industry or political
conditions affecting the firms/organizations under study generally have been ignored
(Mossholder, Bennett and Martin (1998) is an exception). Our study provides an excellent
opportunity to shed light on this aspect of  procedural justice.
As research dealing with issues related to procedural justice evolved, scholars began
to question the role that interpersonal dynamics might play in perceptions of  procedural (and
distributive) justice. Bies and Moag (1986) initially introduced researchers to the argument
that individuals’ fairness judgments also might be based on the nature of the interpersonal
treatment they were accorded by those carrying out the organization’s procedures, in addition
to their perceptions of the fairness of the procedures being used by the organization, or
perceptions of the fairness of the outcomes produced by those procedures. They described
this new kind of justice as interactional justice. 
A lively debate has arisen about the necessity for distinguishing between
interactional and  procedural justice. Many researchers argue that interactional elements
impact procedural justice perceptions, just as structural elements do (e.g., Cropanzano and
Greenberg, 1997). Tyler and Bies (1990) make the point that interpersonal and structural
elements are inseparable. One of the reasons why there is a debate over the efficacy of
interactional justice as a separate construct stems from the fact that much of the research
using the concept apparently has been focused within a single organizational context where it
may be harder to separate individual from organizational aspects of perceived fairness. 
The literature that we have just described generally deals with cases in which rules
that outline elements of  procedural justice generally exist and either are, or are not, followed
by those in an organization charged with adhering to them. Researchers then look at
interactional justice and interactions of perceptions of procedural justice, interactional justice
and distributive justice. But, cases in which no norms defining  procedural justice exist, or in
which the norms are being established, and the impact that this has on perceptions of justice,
appear to have been outside the boundaries of this research. The inter-organizational nature of
our study, involving as it does an attempt to negotiate an international joint venture,
facilitates an investigation of the role of informal processes in establishing norms related to
procedural and  interactional justice and the impact that these processes might have on
perceptions of, or outcomes related to, distributive justice. 
Alliance Process Perspectives
In the last few years, increased research emphasis has been placed on the processes
that drive alliance evolution. Although the importance of the negotiation process is
recognized, little is said on how it unfolds. Zajac and Olsen (1993) place negotiations at the
alliance initializing stage, during which perceptions of value and the parameters of exchange
emerge. Doz (1996) explores how learning processes in alliances mediate between initial
conditions –some of which are the outcome of negotiations– and alliance outcomes. Ariño
and de la Torre (1998) suggest that initial conditions are the outcome of preliminary
negotiation and commitment stages (relying on Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), which the
parties accept provided they satisfy their objectives in an efficient and equitable manner. But
4again, they take this as the starting point in their model of alliance evolution, remaining silent
about what actually happens in these stages. Kumar and Nti (1998) develop a dynamic theory
of alliances by examining outcome and process discrepancies that may emerge as the partners
interact. How discrepancies emerge or operate while partners interact at the negotiation stage
is not explained.
Despite the fact that the alliance process literature has focused on the alliance
operational stage, some of its insights maybe useful to understand the alliance negotiation
process. For instance, Ariño (2001) examines the effect that a firm’s perception of its
partner’s behavior has on the firm’s own behavior. She distinguishes between non-
cooperative behavior by omission and by commission. A firm’s response to its perception of
the partner’s behavior depends on the informational value of this behavior, which is stronger
in the case of non-cooperation by commission than by omission. 
In addition, Ariño et al. (2001) argue that alliance partners are not unitary actors.
Consequently, there may be multifold agency problems in the management of alliances, and
assuming otherwise may be fatal to the relationship. The informational value of perceptions
about a partner’s behavior, as well as the consequences of ignoring the fact that organizations
are not monolithic entities, might also be relevant at the alliance negotiation stage.
Ariño, de la Torre and Ring (2001) characterize negotiation processes as one of the
building blocks of relational quality, in this way highlighting their importance. Other than in
the case of repeat alliances or other past business relations, the negotiation stage provides the
first opportunity for the parties to form opinions about each other anchored in the reality of
direct experience. The scope and intensity of search and deliberation processes may have
direct impacts on the levels of relational quality that will result from negotiations, and
indirect impacts on perceptions of fairness that emerge from the negotiations.
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) provided initial insights on the unfolding of negotiation
processes. According to them, alliance development consists of a repetitive sequence of
negotiation, commitment, and execution stages. In the negotiations stage the focus is on
formal bargaining processes surrounding the logic of the business proposal underlying the
proposed collaboration. Behind the more formal aspects of these early negotiating processes
are informal social-psychological processes of sense making, in which organizational
participants come to appreciate the potential for transacting (in which the focus turns to
clarifying the actual terms and conditions of contracts) with others by reshaping or clarifying
the identity of their own organization. They have suggested that the nature and sequences by
which these informal processes emerge in the more formal negotiation stages of cooperative
inter-organizational relationships may be critical to outcomes. Ring and Rands’ (1989)
investigation of the evolution of a collaborative effort between 3M and NASA provided
support for these suppositions. But issues related to fairness were not specifically addressed
in their study. 
In a study of formation processes in 53 R&D consortia, Doz, Olk and Ring (2000)
found that at least two different formation pathways could be identified, which they labeled
emergent and engineered. Their data, however, shed no light on the role played by
negotiations between the consortia members on subsequent formation processes, or whether
perceptions of fair play influenced outcomes.
Each of the two streams of research just reviewed has the potential to make
contributions to understanding alliances and the dynamic nature of the processes by which
they are formed and evolve over time. As we have indicated, the inability to access
5appropriate kinds of data generally has left the processes of negotiations inside the proverbial
“black box.” Our analysis will shed new light on those processes as we integrate these
streams of research in an effort to develop a more fine-grained framework for the study of
negotiations than currently can be found in either of these literatures.
Methods
Research Setting6
Grupo Palomar (GP) was a Spanish distributor of medical equipment and related
consumables for hospitals. Active in a number of segments including hematology, urology,
gynecology, gastroenterology, anesthesiology, cardiology, diagnosis, etc., GP was number
two in its industry. Consolidated turnover was about 9.8 billion pesetas (US$75M), with 60%
of this coming from sales of consumables. 272 employees worked for the group. GP relied
heavily on a technical service department that had as its mission “to be close to the
equipment.” A logistics and software unit was also a part of the group.
Laboratorios Australes (LA) was an Argentine company that manufactured and
distributed chemical reactives for clinical analysis, and also distributed related equipment.
Operating in an industry dominated by multinational companies, LA had 60 percent of the
domestic market, and had proprietary technology. Overseas sales accounted for about 60
percent of total sales. LA had 140 employees. LA was founded in 1960 by Miguel Rusco and
one other partner. The Rusco family had a majority position in the company, which could be
considered as a family owned company with a few minority shareholders.
The negotiations to form an IJV between GP and LA constitute a revelatory case
(Yin, 1994). Access to data on alliance negotiations is hard to obtain. If the negotiations are
being conducted “secretly,” researchers will not know about them. If the negotiations move
fast the researcher may not have enough time to gain entry before things are over; if there is
advance notice and the researcher is interested, lawyers, investment bankers, partners, etc.,
may not be interested in having an “outsider” observing the events. Even harder is obtaining
data on failed alliance negotiations. When researchers have an opportunity to observe and
analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to other researchers, such conditions justify
the use of a single-case study on the basis of its revelatory nature –even if the phenomenon is
common as opposed to rare or unique (Yin, 1994).
Data Collection and Analysis
Because of the “black-box” surrounding alliance negotiations, we chose an inductive
approach in our study of the role that fairness might play in negotiations. As we have
indicated, we were fortunate enough to gain access to a negotiation between representatives
of a Spanish and an Argentine firm, literally from “Day One.” And in a strange sort of way,
we were fortunate that the negotiations did not succeed.
6
6 The names of the firms that took place in the negotiations have been disguised, as have the names of the
participants in the negotiations.One of the authors, whose native language is Spanish, had the opportunity to serve
as an observer in the initial negotiation round in Argentina. This author also took notes of
informal conversations and details related to the initial meetings. The native Spanish-
speaking author transcribed all of the formal discussions –which were in Spanish– of these
meetings. Wolfgang Knief, one of the principals involved in the negotiations reviewed the
transcript, and praised its accuracy. 
Other data sources include archives, and interviews. Archival data include about 150
typed single-spaced pages, containing all written communications between GP and LA that
took place during the nine months that negotiations lasted, as well as four drafts of a Letter of
Intent (which in total exceed 100 pages), and internal communications from GP. Both authors
translated these documents into English. The author whose native language was Spanish re-
translated the Spanish to English translations of the native English-speaking author back into
Spanish, and checked them against the original. The two authors then resolved any
differences in the interpretation of the documents. Semi-structured interviews with Wolfgang
Knief and Pablo Núñez, a business school professor and an advisor to GP who had brokered
the initial meeting, provided additional insights into key phone conversations and subsequent
meetings between the parties, and also served to triangulate the other two data sources
(Eisenhardt, 1989). These interviews were translated into English by the native English-
speaking author, and translated back into Spanish by the native Spanish-speaking author.
Relying on Miles and Huberman (1984), we employed data reduction techniques,
initially preparing a chronology of the main negotiation events. We outline the chronology in
Table 1 below. Eight events were considered to be “critical incident(s) when parties engage in
actions related to the development of their relationship” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 112).
These critical events are outlined in bold in Table 1.
Initially, we constructed a series of information displays to handle data systematically.
We created a string of conceptually clustered matrices ordered in a temporal sequence based
on each communication document (N=82) in the original data set. Our purpose with this first
cut at the data was to develop insights into the roles that sense-making, understanding, and
commitment processes played in the course of the negotiations, relying on the work of Ring
and Rands (1989) and Ring and Van de Ven (1994). The contents of each document were
classified in categories reflecting these theoretical concepts. The matrices also kept track of
who was communicating with whom (specific participants and their roles as principals or
agents). One of the authors categorized the data, and the other one reviewed this categorization
with almost complete agreement. Then the transcript from the initial negotiation round, and
the 82 archival documents were analyzed in terms of justice categories. The operationalized
indicators used are set forth in the Appendix. Each author classified the data independently
using color and number codes and then together they reviewed their categorizations. In those
instances in which there was disagreement, the native-Spanish author explained the nuances of
the words until agreement was reached. We also focused our efforts on the issues that appeared
to have a greater impact on the inter-partner relationship, again another judgment call based on
the frequency of these issues and on their subsequent consequences. Finally, we compared the
four drafts of the Letter of Intent with each other by building a matrix that displayed a
summary of each clause, and whether there had been any modifications or additions to them in
the subsequent versions of the Letter of Intent.
7Table 1. Negotiation Event Description
8Findings from Issues Arising in the Evolution of the Negotiations7
Over the course of the negotiations, a number of issues arose triggered by the key
events shown in Table 1. We will address those issues in more detail in the narrative set out
below. We focus on the initial meetings in Rosario, the interface issue, the Letter of Intent issue,
the CVI issue, the Düsseldorf meeting and the efforts by the parties to deal with the shadow of
the future once it was clear that they could not reach an agreement on the IJV. Of the 82
communications, 57 were related to these issues. Table 2 summarizes the frequency with which
justice concerns arose in these communications between specific parties to the negotiations.
Table 2.
Legend:
# = number of communications. Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells
designate how many times each justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; ; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ  = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
CF = César; GR = Gustavo; JR = Josefa; Os = Others; MR = Miguel; WK = Wolfgang; (*) = to lawyer;
(**) = to/from Pablo
9
7 As readers might assume, we have an enormous amount of data on these issues. To economize on space, we
present only the highlights related to these six issues and only representative quotes from the meetings we
observed or the written materials to which we had access. The Initial Meeting: Governance Issues Surface
The negotiations between LA and GP began in Rosario, Argentina. The participants
at this initial round of the negotiations included: Wolfgang Knief, César Freje (representing
GP) Miguel, Gustavo, Federico and Josefa Rusco (representing LA). Pablo Núñez (the
broker), Barto Mata and Manuel Planas (two of LA’s top executives) also were present, as
was one of the authors who served as an observer.
The initial meeting provided both parties with an opportunity to explore each other’s
mental models related to their approach to business, and they found much in common.
Wolfgang Knief and César Freje initially explained that they had decided that bringing along
a detailed proposal would be inappropriate. They preferred to hear from representatives of
LA about the potential collaboration, its goals and objectives, etc. Wolfgang Knief explained:
“So that there are no misunderstandings: we did not come to participate in your company. If
you would permit us, we would have to study your proposition first. I do not believe that you
are seeking this” (referring to any possible thought that GP might be interested in taking an
equity position in LA).8 The representatives of GP were quite open about how they
conducted their business in response to an inquiry from Miguel Rusco about “resources,
structure of costs, etc.” and outlined in great detail their cost structure, margins, cost of
capital, etc. They explained the relationships that they had with suppliers of medical
equipment whom they represented in Spain as well as the way that they dealt with customers.
They also discussed their approach to the training of sales personnel. 
The parties explored a wide range of issues that they would have to deal with if they
wanted to collaborate. The founders provided insights into the history of their firms.
Representatives of both firms talked about the nature of their businesses, and provided
straightforward answers in response to questions from each other in efforts to be perceived as
acting in  procedurally fair ways. GP also outlined their approach to entering markets outside
of Spain. LA provided initial insights into their capabilities as a partner offering entry into the
Argentine and Latin American markets.
On the second day, conversations were directed towards the formal governance
aspects of the proposed venture. Wolfgang Knief indicated that they ought to discuss “How to
legally set it up; not that we have to resolve that here, we will do it with a consultant.” For his
part, Gustavo Rusco agreed, noting, however, that they did have to identify “the criteria that
we will give to the consultant.” 
The parties initially focused on the possibility of creating a holding company owned
by GP and LA, with GP holding a majority stake so as to be able to consolidate balance
sheets. As Wolfgang Knief stated: “We want to have the majority in the JV. Not so that we do
as we please, but with clauses that protect you and that keep us from doing anything that will
harm you. Now there will be losses; we do not think that it is just that you will have to stand
them. We propose that you have participation within the range of 30-49%.”
LA expressed its concerns about the proposed split of ownership. Miguel Rusco
replied: “There are aspects about the knowledge of the business that are yours. But a simpler
version, so that we do not generate confusion on the subject of minority protection, is 50-50.
What is to be discussed is the political power, not the economics.” Wolfgang Knief
10
8 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes reflect the statements of the parties as expressed in researcher notes,
letters, faxes, etc.acknowledged the need to deal with this: “The political matter is important. The problem
with a 50-50 JV is that, if there are no formulas, it can become immobile. We know how to
resolve it, we do not aspire to have the political power in the sense that we do as we please.” 
The second day of the meeting produced a significant amount of sense making about
conditions under which each side might consider entering into a joint venture. The
discussions ought to have made it clear to both sides that they had very different views about
the distribution of ownership shares in any joint venture. 
The discussions at the initial meeting gave rise to a variety of organizational justice
issues, as outlined in Table 3 below. Issues related to distributive justice surfaced almost
immediately, and were dominant in day two of the meetings. The communications were very
open and were two-way. This openness in communications between the parties quickly
revealed a lack of agreement on the fundamental question of who would contribute what,
who would get what, who would own what, issues related to distributive justice. The parties
appeared aware of this fact, but not of the consequences that might evolve from failing to
deal with it, at least initially, in these early rounds of the negotiation process.
Table 3.
Legend:
Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells designate how many times each
justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; ; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ  = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes; PN = Pablo Núñez
On Day 1 dinner was taken at a restaurant.  On Day 2 dinner was taken at the home of the Ruscos.  Because of
the social nature of these two events, no notes were taken.  There were, however, many occasions on which
evidence of Codes IJ1 and IJ4 were observed.
11There is also a clear sense in the language used and the topics discussed in this
initial meeting that the parties sought to be fair in  procedural justice terms. There was much
discussion about the interests of the parties, reflecting an effort to demonstrate
representativeness (Levinthal, 1980). These same discussions provided ample opportunities
for direct feedback and reflected an effort to insure that decisions that were made at the
meeting had adequate justification. Care was taken to provide accurate information (GP had
brought along a substantial amount of written documentation which they shared with LA).
The initial meeting also provides evidence of a concern for interactional justice, i.e.,
the parties sought to establish a basis for perceiving each as dealing fairly with the other as
individuals. There was a substantial effort in the discussions to establish respect for each
other. The parties actively sought to suppress any a priori bias that they might have had about
the capabilities of each other based on nationality or the location of their businesses; in
particular, the two principals, Wolfgang Knief and Miguel Rusco, appeared to be getting
along very well.  
Towards the end of the second day the focus of the parties shifted again from
concerns for distributive justice to efforts to further define norms of  procedural justice. The
parties agreed that enough progress had been made for them to be able to develop a timetable
for action and a set of procedures about going forward that would include reaching agreement
on the products that would be initially introduced in the Latin American marketplace, a
search for a manager and a controller, sales personnel, the training of those individuals, all
with a view to a February/March starting date. They also agreed that each side would
designate an individual who would represent its interests in subsequent discussions. Finally,
they agreed to meet in Barcelona so that the people from LA could get a first-hand look at GP
and its operations.
There was no indication during the initial meeting, however, that they agreed to a
clear order of priority on what needed to be done first. They also did not agree in the face-to-
face meeting on who would conduct the subsequent negotiations for LA. This gives rise to
the second major issue in the negotiations, one in which both procedural and interactional
justice issues appear to be more prominent than distributive justice.
The Interface Issue
This issue emerged from communications that took place April 30th to May 20th. In
Table 4, we provide data derived from these communications, separating them into
judgments about distributive, procedural and interactional justice. 
Upon returning to Barcelona, Wolfgang Knief sent a letter, dated April 30th, to
Miguel Rusco in which he commented on the “high level of chemistry” that emerged from
the meetings, referring to the compatibility of the two firms and of the individuals who had
met in Rosario. On May 10th Miguel Rusco responded to Wolfgang Knief’s letter. He, too,
noted the “friendly tenor of the meeting as being familiar, folksy and professional.” He “liked
the way things have started.” He also confirmed Wolfgang’s perception that they and their
two firms “had similar approaches to business and family.” 
The comments of Wolfgang Knief and Miguel Rusco provide further support for our
conclusion that the sense making that took place at the initial meeting had produced, at an
interactional justice level, a belief by the principals that they had dealt fairly with each other.
The principals of the firms were very personal in their salutations and closings and the
substance of their communications was far less business-oriented than that contained in the
12faxed communications of their agents. The parties were providing a significant amount of
explanation to each other in their efforts to act fairly at an interactional justice level,
consistent with the tenor set at their initial meetings in Rosario.
Table 4.
Legend:
Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells designate how many times each
justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ  = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
CF = César; GR = Gustavo; JR = Josefa; Os = Others; MR = Miguel; WK = Wolfgang
Most of the content of these communications that took place in this time frame,
however, was designed to demonstrate that the parties were trying to live up to the informal
agreements they had made in Rosario to provide each other with information deemed
necessary to move things along. As no priorities regarding what ought to be done had been
established in Rosario, the parties implicitly were left to establish norms of  procedural
fairness as they moved forward.
Moreover, these communications gave rise to an additional issue that was to play a
role in the ultimate outcome of the negotiations. Towards the end of the initial negotiation
meetings, Wolfgang Knief had designated César Freje as GP’s lead negotiator, but LA had
not appointed his counterpart. 
César Freje sent a fax to Miguel Rusco on May 2nd asking for data on 15 different
points that would be needed to begin developing a solid business plan for the proposed
venture. He also asked that Miguel convey César’s “warmest regards” to Miguel’s sons and
13daughters.  Miguel Rusco responded to César later that day (Argentina time) informing him
that LA had designated Gustavo Rusco as his counterpart in the negotiations. He also
informed César that they would “get as much as possible” of the requested information. 
In a May 3rd fax to Gustavo Rusco, César Freje asked for clarification about LA’s
distribution capabilities, whether they employed direct sales representatives, what
relationships they had with other firms for the provision of distribution, etc. Gustavo replied
on May 3rd, informing César that LA had decided to go outside the firm for answers to some
of the data questions that GP had asked. He explained to César that: “market data is hard to
get in a reliable fashion.” In addition, he provided answers to some of the questions that were
raised in César’s May 3rd fax. 
Of necessity, sense making processes were passive in nature, taking the form of
reports, memos, etc. Behind these reports, however, the parties were also engaged in active
sense making as they undertook independent market research efforts. Not surprisingly,
virtually all of the substantive content of the correspondence between the agents over this
time frame related to each side providing the other with information and data that would be
needed to reach agreements on what kinds of products would be distributed in Latin America,
and who would be responsible for managing distribution efforts. Each side was quite specific
as to the kinds of data they were seeking. 
Between May 3rd and May 15th César sent Gustavo five additional communications.
Gustavo’s first response came in a fax on May 16th indicating that he would be traveling the
following week and in his absence his sister Josefa would assume the interface role - another
signal of efforts to be perceived as providing explanation (Levinthal, 1980), an indicator of
fairness in  procedural justice terms. Gustavo mentioned that he would return by the 26th
of May. On May 20th Josefa Rusco sent a fax to César indicating that Gustavo was in
Venezuela and that she should be viewed as part of the team: “I will keep you informed of
any changes at our end.” After coming back from his trip to Venezuela, Gustavo did not re-
assume the interface role. Even when César wrote directly to him, Josefa was the one who
answered back. Thereafter, Gustavo would get directly involved in communications and
negotiations only after major conflicts arose.
The communications between César Freje and Gustavo and Josefa Rusco reveal the
first cracks in the developing relationship between the individuals. It is possible that César
Freje was not pleased with the way he had been treated by his counterpart Gustavo Rusco. He
may have felt that he had been unfairly dealt with as an individual and that the brother and
sister had violated an agreement their father had “signed-off” on in his May 2nd fax to Freje.
As will be seen, this perceived “slight” would manifest itself in other ways in subsequent
dealings between the two sides.
The Letter of Intent Issue
This issue arose from communications that were initiated in June. The issue was the
most pronounced aspect of the negotiations between June and October. The major provisions
of the Letter of Intent and the nature of major changes proposed in each draft are summarized
in Table 5. The Table also reflects actions taken by the parties on these provisions during the
course of the negotiations. These communications provide very clear evidence of the impact




Clauses in bold indicate those on which the parties never reached agreement
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
PA = proposal accepted; PC = proposal changed; PM = proposal made
Table 6.
Legend:
Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells designate how many times each
justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ  = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
CF = César; GR = Gustavo; JR = Josefa; Os = Others; MR = Miguel; WK = Wolfgang
(*) = to lawyer; (**) = to/from Pablo
15On June 21st César sent Josefa an initial version of the proposed Letter of Intent,
which had been prepared by GP’s lawyers, and was intended to outline the terms of an equity
joint venture. César had received the draft document earlier that month and had made a
number of what he considered to be “minor changes.” Prior to sending the proposal off to
Josefa he notified GP’s lawyers on the 21st, by fax, of the nature of his changes and also
circulated an internal communication within GP to Wolfgang and his brother Juan (one of the
owners of GP, and also a manager), also on the 21st, and forwarded a copy to Pablo Núñez.
In the fax that accompanied the draft Letter of Intent he indicated to Josefa that he
would like her “to give me your comments ... and in principle it would be what we will sign”
(in July during their visit to Barcelona) so that they could “move forward with our intentions
and, immediately after the European summer, finally be able to hire, like we had agreed, the
controller and commercial manager.” César is clearly hoping to produce a commitment from
LA to reach an early agreement on the governance of the IJV. But, his actions also reflect a
lack of awareness that the initial meetings had not produced any mutual assent of the
ownership split issue.
Interestingly, the proposed Letter of Intent was attached to a fax to Josefa from
César, responding to her fax of the previous day in which she had asked for his views on
what products might sell best in Argentina so that LA might begin working on the question of
what would be required to meet government approvals for distribution. She also indicated
that she would try to get more, and better, data on the Latin American markets for medical
products, another indication of the on-going sense making efforts being undertaken by the
parties. Similarly, these two communications reflected efforts by the parties to demonstrate
that they were living up to their commitments in Rosario, communicating in clear and open
ways with each other, providing feedback as quickly as possible (all indicators of a concern
for  procedural justice).
The same could not be said for the way in which the proposed Letter of Intent was
received at LA. It came as a shock to them. They were surprised by the tone of the letter; one
that was a significant departure from the tone of previous conversations and communications.
They immediately got on the phone to Pablo Núñez. The 21st was a Friday and the following
Monday –the 24th– was a holiday in Barcelona, so the fact that Núñez worked on a response
over this long holiday weekend is an indication of how important he felt it would be to
resolve any problems before they became too serious. His impression of the call was that they
“were climbing the walls.” Norms of both  procedural and interactional justice had been
breached.
The strict deadlines it outlined were seen as moving away from the flexible approach
GP had demonstrated in Rosario in April, a breach of  procedural justice. And the proposal
regarding the ownership split took them very much by surprise, in part because they thought
that it had been clear when GP left Rosario that LA had serious concerns about any
ownership split that was not 50-50 (an indication that César’s sense making there had been
inadequate).
Pablo Núñez immediately got in touch with Wolfgang Knief and explained how
upset the people at LA were over both the substance of the proposed Letter of Intent and the
way in which the message had been delivered. Pablo also faxed César on the 25th of June
indicating “I do not like [the draft] written by the lawyers. We probably have not explained
our project thoroughly and well enough to them [the lawyers].” He noted 5 points that needed
to be revised and concluded that “As a whole, the letter must convey an amiable feeling, the
same with which we initiated this deal. Let us not forget that we took the initiative by
approaching them with the business proposal.”
16Wolfgang Knief responded on July 1st in a fax to Gustavo Rusco. “I have received,
while away from the office, a copy of the rough draft of the Letter of Intent that César has
sent you. As you can imagine, our lawyer has written this document and it is a typical ‘cold’
document that lawyers write. But it does not reflect what I would like to have sent to you,
given our friendly relationship.” He indicated that the letter would have to be rewritten on a
number of key points and that he would be in touch by phone and looked forward to seeing
Gustavo in Barcelona. He closed by sending his “very warmest regards.” César sent a fax of
a similar tone to Josefa. This series of communications appears to temporarily smooth ruffled
feathers, and both sides agreed to continue conversations during the July trip to Barcelona. 
In these communications we find evidence of a concern on the part of Wolfgang,
Pablo and César to repair the breaches at the interactional justice level caused by César’s
breach at a  procedural justice level. The responses of Pablo Núñez (to Gustavo on June 24th)
and Wolfgang Knief (to Gustavo on July 1st) clearly demonstrate their awareness of the
problem that César’s fax had caused. Pablo’s memo to César of June 25th was designed to
make the point to him that LA was justified in viewing his actions as a breach of  procedural
justice. César’s fax to Josefa on June 26th reflects that he got the message and was acting to
minimize the damage and remedy perceptions of unfairness related to interactional justice. 
The next communication between the parties occurred on July 19th nearly three
weeks later. This was the longest period of time during which the two sides had not
communicated with each other, although part of the gap was due to vacation time in
Argentina. Here is a case in which actions appear to speak louder than words. The “blackout”
in communications between July 2nd and July 19th might have signaled César and others at
GP that LA was still upset about the way the initial draft of the Letter of Intent had been
handled. 
In the July 19th fax, Gustavo informed César that he and Manuel Planas would arrive
in Barcelona on July 22nd. The July 19th fax had a decided chill to it. LA did not request that
a GP representative meet them at the airport, or make hotel reservations for them (something
they had done for GP on the visit to Rosario). They also made it clear that they had other
business to accomplish while in Barcelona and proposed that GP meet with them from the
24th to the 26th, after which they would return to Argentina, and that they would call César
upon their arrival in Barcelona.
The July meeting in Barcelona was all business, and focused primarily on a renewed
discussion of the contents of the Letter of Intent. On September 18th, César sent a fax to
Gustavo that included a significantly revised version of the Letter of Intent. César began by
noting that he was “happy to enclose this letter, which I hope carries the spirit of what we
discussed during your last stay in Barcelona.” Seeking to avoid any repetition of the
misunderstanding that flowed from his initial draft, he observed that “There are some points
that we have had to write just the way they appear because of legal issues, although we would
like to comment on them in detail via the telephone so that they are not misinterpreted.” He
also informed Gustavo that Wolfgang would be contacting him directly as well. They also
discussed plans to meet face-to-face on these issues during an October visit to Argentina. 
The meeting in Barcelona provided an opportunity for the parties to restore a sense
of fair play. The ability to discuss issues related to the Letter of Intent face-to-face, and with
the principals directly involved, appears to have gotten negotiations back on track.  Virtually
all of the key clauses in the original proposal were changed (see Table 5 above). The
language in the September 18th fax from César to Gustavo, quoted above, provides evidence
that the former was seeking to repair any lingering sense of unfairness in terms of
interactional justice.
17The CVI Issue: Hedging Bets
The Barcelona meeting occurred just before the traditional summer vacation period
began in Spain. Consequently, very little communication occurred between that trip and the
end of August. On August 28th Josefa Rusco faxed César Freje beginning a series of twenty-
six communications leading up to the trip by César to Argentina in early October. Data
related to justice issues derived from these communications are set forth below in Table 7.
Table 7.
Legend:
Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells designate how many times each
justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ  = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
CF = César; GR = Gustavo; JR = Josefa; Os = Others; MR = Miguel; WK = Wolfgang
18The October trip was designed to provide further information on Latin American
markets that the proposed joint venture would serve. A number of important congresses were
scheduled for the fall in Argentina and both parties saw these as an opportunity for more
active sense making. As we have indicated above, César and Gustavo also intended to
continue their discussions on governance issues. 
The correspondence between the parties in late August and early September reflects
an effort by the parties to set the agenda for the October meeting, and to make sure that they
were on the same page regarding outcomes of the visit, a sense making activity. Nonetheless,
the parties still had not reached any agreement about what products would be handled by the
proposed IJV, nor had they committed to doing so by any specific date.
On the 4th of October, César faxed Josefa to inform her that he would be arriving
earlier than planned and that his wife would be accompanying him. More importantly, he also
indicated –for the first time– that he intended to visit with Mr. Kermit W. Son of CVI, SA, of
Buenos Aires. The visit was planned for either the afternoon of the 10th or the morning of the
11th. He told her in the fax that CVI was “very interested in doing business with the proposed
JV.” CVI was a distributor of cardiology equipment.
Since one of the provisions of the draft Letter of Intent that the parties had agreed to
honor prohibited either of the parties from negotiating with other parties while they were in
negotiations with each other, the revelation was not well received by LA. Indeed, it was a
serious breach of procedural justice. 
On the 7th of October, Josefa responded indicating that Gustavo would like to be
included in the meeting and suggested that they try to get together with representatives of
CVI on the afternoon of the 10th. César responded on the 8th: “Without meaning to offend
you, I really need to have the initial meeting with CVI alone.” He was concerned that the
correspondence might have created a breach of interactional justice, which it clearly had. But
the correspondence reveals that he also believed that GP and LA should get a proposal from
CVI first before GP/LA responded to it. We view this as an effort to set new boundaries of a
procedural justice nature, but ones that could not (and did not) override the seriousness of the
breach he had already committed. 
César met with the CVI representatives during his October meeting and scheduled a
second meeting for his November visit to Argentina. Representatives from LA were not
present, and the seriousness of the breach of procedural justice intensified. At the level of
interactional justice, Gustavo and Josefa perceived the actions by César as a serious breach.
He had demonstrated a lack of respect for them (and the interests of LA) and also a lack of
ethicality.
The CVI issue next arises in the course of setting the agenda for the November visit
by César to Argentina. In a fax to Josefa dated November 4th, César indicated that he still
thought that a collaboration between the proposed IJV and CVI would make sense, although
he understood that Gustavo and others at LA did not see it the same way. He also revealed
that he would be meeting with an Argentine business school professor during this visit to
explore a possible merger between CVI and the proposed IJV. But he again indicated that he
wished to meet with these individuals alone, and only after that with Gustavo and Josefa.
Gustavo responded on November 6th that the “CVI proposal worries me since I have been left
out of the scope of negotiations once more” and that César “needs to be in Argentina to
discuss this with me.” César answered “I have kept you [Gustavo] in the dark for your own
good so I could be very specific about a proposal between CVI and the [proposed IJV].” He
19added “since you were not too enthused, I thought it would be best for me to fully develop
my thoughts on why the [proposed merger] makes sense.” César met with the people from
CVI. Josefa, however, did not show up at his hotel or at the meetings with various exhibitors
at the conference that she had arranged for him. He did meet with Gustavo to further discuss
issues related to the November 4th draft Letter of Intent. As reflected in Table 7, a number of
important issues remained unresolved and they agreed that they would continue their
discussion of these issues, as well as continuing their discussions about the proposed IJV and
the role that CVI might play, if any, in the IJV, in Düsseldorf, Germany in mid-November
during a previously scheduled visit by Gustavo. 
Düsseldorf: The End of the Beginning
Gustavo followed up with a fax on November 13th indicating a “need to talk about
issues requiring immediate attention about which we talked during your last visit to Buenos
Aires” and suggesting that they get together on the afternoon of the 19th of November. He
also asked for a final draft of the Letter of Intent that dealt with changes on which they had
agreed during the Buenos Aires visit. César responded on the 15th of November suggesting
that they meet in his hotel in Düsseldorf on the 19th, and followed up later that day, indicating
that he had just talked with Wolfgang Knief and Pablo Núñez, who had returned to Barcelona
“from a full week trip”, explaining “I can’t meet with them until November 21st” so “we can’t
move forward on our conversations in Düsseldorf” but I “still want to meet with you on the
19th around 6:00 pm and then have dinner.” In Table 8 below we set out the frequency with
which concerns for justice issues were raised. 
Table 8.
Legend:
Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells designate how many times each
justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
CF = César; GR = Gustavo; JR = Josefa; Os = Others; MR = Miguel; WK = Wolfgang
Dealing with the Shadow of the Future
Despite the fact that it ought to have been clear that the negotiations were at an end,
the parties spent a good deal of time communicating with each other during the month of
December. On December 5th Gustavo Rusco sent a fax to César indicating that he was
20waiting for a call from César to pick up the discussion on issues, especially the unresolved
issues surrounding the proposed Letter of Intent. LA was still very much interested in
pursuing the IJV.
At GP, on the other hand, a decision had been made to bring the negotiations to an
end. The executives at GP were wrestling with the question of how to let the people at LA
know this, and in a manner that was designed to preserve, as much as possible, the good
relationships that had been established between the owners/principals and between the
agents. There was a clear concern for the shadow of the future that they might cast over their
relationship. In Table 9 below we provide evidence of the concern for justice related issues
raised by the parties during these communications.
Table 9.
Legend:
Numbers in the first row designate justice indicators. Numbers in other cells designate how many times each
justice indicator appears:
DJ   =  Distributive Justice: 1 = outcomes proportional to contributions
PJ  =  Procedural Justice: 1 = representativeness; 2 = timely feedback; 3 = using information for feedback;
4 = adequate justification for decisions; 5 = effective two-way communication; 6 = accuracy of information;
7 = full accounting; 8 = consistency of approach; 9 = principals and agents are on the same page
IJ  = Interactional Justice: 1 = respect; 2 = blaming; 3 = ethicality; 4 = effective two-way communication;
5 = bias suppression
GP = Grupo Palomar; LA = Laboratorios Australes
CF = César; GR = Gustavo; JR = Josefa; Os = Others; MR = Miguel; WK = Wolfgang
(*) = to/from Pablo
By the 10th of December, César was attempting to contact Pablo by phone indicating
that he had been avoiding taking phone calls from LA because he did not know what to tell
them. He was anxious that personal contact be made, and was willing to do so himself. He
was told that Pablo was on a trip and would be back on the 12th.
On December 13th, Wolfgang Knief dictated a letter to Gustavo Rusco in which he
indicated that GP was not going forward and that Pablo Núñez had sent him a letter outlining
the reasons why this was so. He indicated that he “liked you and your family and trusted
them from the start.” He went on to say that he wanted to thank them “very sincerely for the
interest and affection you have always shown to us. Let’s stay in close personal contact and
who knows what the future may bring in the way of new business opportunities. Please
convey my warmest personal regards to your father and your brother and sister...” As of
December 24th, the letter still had not been sent, apparently because Wolfgang’s secretary was
waiting for his return from a business trip for a signature.
21In the interim, Gustavo Rusco had sent a fax in letter form to Pablo Núñez. It was
very formal in its style and tone, and quite detailed in presenting LA’s views of where things
stood. In a nutshell, Gustavo indicated that they had “gotten the news, that they didn’t like it,
can’t agree with the decision and can’t rationalize it.” He also indicated that “at the strictly
personal level I have not wanted to turn this response into a lot of reproaches”.
Wolfgang Knief finally sent a letter to Gustavo on the 24th of December explaining
why the December 13th draft letter had not been sent. He “personally” extended “thanks for
the letter you sent to Pablo Núñez and [that it was] one more confirmation about your human
qualities.” He indicated that he, too, understood that these kinds of deals were very complex
and that the two sides did not always end up seeing eye to eye, and closed by saying that “I
am very sorry if our decision has been a disappointment to you and once again I want to
assure you that we have great personal appreciation for your family” and hoped that they
would once again have an opportunity to pursue new business deals in the future.
The final piece of correspondence between the parties is a fax from César Freje to
Josefa Rusco on January 3rd. Josefa had indicated in a fax to César, dated December 20th that
she had had an intuition during his November visit that the project was coming to an end. He
wanted to assure her that this was not the case; that he was still committed at that time. He
also indicated that he thought that the reason why the deal fell through was that “the parties
had never been able to sign a Letter of Intent because each had different reasons for not doing
so.” He closed by saying that “past is past and I wish you all kinds of success in your
business” and hoped that he would be able to visit with them if he returned to Argentina.
Discussion and implications
An obvious question emerges from the foregoing discussion. Why were the parties
unable to reach an agreement, particularly since they appeared to have gotten off to such a
good start in Rosario? Our analysis of the data suggests three plausible scenarios.
First, over time it became increasingly clear to GP that LA would not provide the
kinds of access to Latin American markets that they had initially anticipated as they left
Rosario. LA had a hard time delivering market data on a timely basis, and even indicated that
they were going to employ outside market researchers to develop some of the data that GP
would require. Evidence of GP’s growing concern can also be found in the decision to
explore alternatives to LA, as revealed in the decision to talk with CVI during their October
and November visits to Argentina. The negotiations failed because GP concluded there was
no business logic to the deal. Any number of economic theories could be employed to explain
this outcome. As our focus here is on justice, we leave it to others to explore their relevance
here. We do note, however, that Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Ariño and de la Torre
(1998) have argued that successful alliances require that the parties meet both efficiency and
equity objectives. Arguably, the parties satisfied neither in our case.
Second, the two sides had very different views about the governance of any IJV they
might undertake, especially with regards to ownership, financial and human resource
contributions (an issue related to distributive justice). Each side saw that this was the case at
the first meetings in Rosario. Neither side was prepared to move from their starting position.
Neither did over the intervening eight months. The negotiations failed because each side
viewed the other as acting unfairly with regard to insuring that benefits gained would be
proportional to contributions made.
22Third, agents at both GP and LA got “hung-up” on issues related to procedural and
interactional justice (the interface, Letter of Intent and CVI issues) that made it easier for
them to ignore the need to deal with the more pressing and difficult issue of distributive
justice (the governance issue). Over time, enthusiasm generated at the initial meeting in
Rosario waned, and relationships between the parties slowly deteriorated.
In all likelihood, elements of all three scenarios were in play and in combination
explain the failure to close the deal. What, then, does our study provide in the way of insight
about the roles that justice theory can play in explaining alliance negotiations? Before we
begin we remind our readers that the parties in our case had no prior experience in dealing
with each other, and relatively little experience with alliances in general. More experienced
parties may not have encountered some of the problems that arose in our case. In addition,
some of the parties in this case were at times acting as principals and at other times as agents,
and some of the agents played multiple roles over the course of the negotiations. In other
settings, the roles of principals and agents might be more clearly delineated. In the
propositions that follow, an implied assumption is that the parties are dealing with each other
for the first time. In addition, they are all ceteris paribus propositions.
Initially, the principals at GP and LA made their views on the issue of distributive
justice very clear. The discussion around the ownership split of the collaboration reflected
serious concerns by both parties that their individual contributions would be dealt with fairly.
The significant differences that did emerge could have been anticipated. Indeed, this appears
to have been the case at GP which did not come to the meeting with a formal proposal
regarding ownership even though it is clear from their statements at the meeting that they
knew going in that they would be seeking a majority position in the proposed IJV. 
The fact that GP did not arrive at the meeting with a fully developed proposal,
however, can be taken as an indication that they were concerned with being perceived as
acting fairly in procedural justice terms. Nonetheless, Wolfgang Knief and Miguel Rusco also
left it to their agents to establish norms of  procedural fairness, to identify what needed to be
done and in what order of priority, as well as resolving the question of the ownership split. 
If issues related to distributive and procedural justice were left unresolved by the
principals during the initial meeting at Rosario, the same cannot be said for fairness
considered in terms of interactional justice. We observed a lot of personal chemistry between
the parties at the Rosario meeting. We believe that this was a result of the fact that the owners
were of a similar age (as were their right-hand men). Both had built their businesses. They
spoke the same language, and they appeared to think about business in the same way. They
had had similar experiences in dealing with business relationships as Wolfgang Knief noted:
“We understand you because we have been through the same process, but we were on the
other side. I am not surprised what you are asking (referring to the 50/50 ownership split).”  
As this was the first time that these parties had dealt with each other, their initial
dealings were largely defined by their reactions to each other as persons. Both because of the
personal chemistry that developed between them, and because of the trust that both parties
had in Pablo Núñez, a solid level of inter-personal trust emerged from the beginning. By the
end of the initial round of negotiations the principals discovered that they genuinely liked
each other, and the same seemed to be true for their agents. They had been very open in their
discussions. No questions were raised about treating the information that had been exchanged
with confidentiality. No confidentiality agreements were employed, although they did agree
that they would not disclose their discussions to third parties. Similarly, César Freje, Gustavo
Rusco and Josefa Rusco appeared to have developed a liking for each other and an initial
23sense that they would be able to work well together in behalf of their principals. Their
backgrounds and experiences were generally similar. They spoke a common language and
had spent their professional lives within similar business environments. And nothing in their
conduct during the initial round of the negotiations appears to have given rise to any concerns
that they could not trust each other.
A serious difference of opinion about distributive justice had surfaced during the active
sense making that took place in Rosario, but was not recognized by the parties as such. In sum, it
appears that at the initial meetings in Rosario efforts to be perceived as acting fairly in
interactional and procedural terms may have “blinded” the parties to the discrepancies that had
emerged in distributive justice terms. With this in mind, we offer the following propositions:
Proposition 1a: If an alliance negotiation is to move forward, the ex ante expectations of
principals regarding distributive,  procedural and  interactional justice, as
well as agents’ ex ante expectations of interactional justice have to be met
in the course of an initial round of the negotiations.
Proposition 1b:  A focal principal’s perception of interactional justice at the end of the initial
alliance negotiation round is a function of her perceptions of distributive and
procedural justice, of her counterpart principal’s personal factors, and of her
counterpart’s behavior during the initial round of the negotiations.
Proposition  1c: An overemphasis on interactional justice issues during the initial
negotiation round diverts the attention of principals from distributive and
procedural justice issues. 
Proposition 1d:  A focal agent’s perception of interactional justice at the end of the initial
alliance negotiation round is a function of her counterpart agent’s personal
factors and behavior during the initial round of the negotiations.
Believing that the Rosario meeting had established a basis for going forward, the
principals turned matters over to their agents. In this case, the two principals –Wolfgang
Knief and Miguel Rusco– never really got involved in dealing directly with each other after
Rosario. Resolving outcome discrepancies related to distributive justice issues, however, is
not the work of agents, particularly in firms in which the founders are still actively involved
in management. Clearly this was the case at GP, where César Freje, although a long-time
confidant of Wolfgang Knief, was not a family member. Gustavo Rusco acted as if he was a
principal during the course of the negotiations, but the fact remained that it was still his
father’s business. Neither unilaterally, nor collectively, could these men make final decisions
on the ownership split in the proposed joint venture.
The failure of the principals to even acknowledge that they had serious differences
of opinions regarding the distributive justice issue also meant that their agents were left with
virtually no guidance as to how the principals expected the issue to be resolved. Or by when!
Although the resolution of issues related to establishing norms of procedural justice appears
to be well within the range of an agent’s duties, how well those duties can be carried out is
clearly a function of the guidance provided by principals. In this case, the principals offered
very little insight to each other as to their thinking about how the negotiations should go
forward and provided too little oversight, at critical times, of the actions of their agents (as
reflected in the discussions of the interface and Letter of Intent issues). Thus, we offer the
following propositions:
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will have a negative effect on agents’ perceptions of procedural justice once
alliance negotiations move beyond initial rounds.
Proposition 2b:  Principals’ failure to reach an agreement on procedural justice concerns will
have a negative effect on agents’ perceptions of procedural justice once
alliance negotiations move beyond initial rounds.
Proposition 2c:  Principals’ failure to reach an agreement on distributive justice concerns
will have a negative effect on agents’ perceptions of interactional justice
once alliance negotiations move beyond initial rounds.
Proposition 2d:  Principals’ failure to reach an agreement on procedural justice concerns will
have a negative effect on agents’ perceptions of interactional justice once
alliance negotiations move beyond initial rounds.
Proposition 2e:  Even if principals agree on procedural justice concerns, failure to assign
priorities to them will have a negative effect on agents’ perceptions of
procedural justice once alliance negotiations move beyond initial rounds.
In the very early phases of this negotiation, outcomes appear to have been a function
of which set of agents was dealing with each other. César was the primary agent for GP, but
that role at LA shifted from time to time back and forth between Gustavo and Josefa Rusco.
César assumed he was to deal with Gustavo, rightfully so in light of the actions of Miguel
Rusco in his May 2nd fax to César indicating that Gustavo would be his counterpart. Gustavo
apparently had other ideas, and passed the ball to his sister. Nonetheless, Josefa Rusco and
César Freje initially dealt well with each other, in spite of what seemed like an important
slight to César, both in terms of interactional and norms of procedural justice that were
initially established in Rosario. The relationship improved until César breached the norms
established at Rosario with the first draft of the proposed Letter of Intent. At this point,
Gustavo reasserts his role as César’s counterpart, and the two resume work towards reaching
an agreement during the July meeting in Barcelona. At this point, Josefa resumes her role as
César’s counterpart as they plan for the October visit to Argentina. César again breaches
norms of procedural justice by announcing that he will be talking with a potential third party
partner during that visit. Gustavo indicates his displeasure, but indirectly through his sister.
The foregoing discussion leads us to offer the following propositions regarding the
roles of agents in negotiation processes and the effect they have on perceptions of justice.
Proposition  3a: A focal agent’s lack of understanding that her counterparts may have
different perceptions of distributive, procedural, and/or interactional justice
will have a positive effect on the chances of alliance negotiation failure.
Proposition  3b: A focal agent’s lack of understanding of how her counterpart’s
principal/agent roles affect her counterpart’s perceptions of distributive,
procedural, and interactional justice may lead to misunderstandings that
have a negative effect on the focal agent’s perceptions of interactional
justice.
Proposition  3c: A focal agent’s lack of understanding about the role played by her
counterpart (whether that of a principal or of an agent) has a positive effect
on the chances of alliance negotiation failure.
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agents may have different perceptions of distributive,  procedural, and/or
interactional justice has on the chances of alliance negotiation failure is
stronger than that of the focal agent’s lack of understanding that her
counterpart is acting as a principal or as an agent.
Proposition  3e: The effect that a focal agent’s lack of understanding of how her
counterpart’s principal/agent roles affect the counterpart’s perceptions
of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice has on the chances of
alliance negotiation failure is stronger than that of the focal agent’s lack
of understanding that her counterpart is acting as a principal or as an agent.
The parties’ perceptions of procedural and  interactional justice appear to have
interacted in significant ways as the parties dealt with the issues that arose over the course of
the negotiations. Perceptions related to procedural justice affected perceptions related to
interactional justice as a result of the mishandling of the Letter of Intent. Perceptions related
to interactional justice may have affected perceptions related to procedural justice in the
interface issue. Perceptions of interactional justice may have affected perceptions of procedural
justice leading up to and at the July Barcelona meeting. Perceptions of interactional justice may
have affected perceptions of procedural justice leading up to and during the October trip to
Argentina. Perceptions of procedural justice clearly affected perceptions of interactional justice
on the CVI issue. The perceptions of the parties related to interactional justice may have
affected their perceptions of procedural justice during the November Argentina meeting.
Perceptions related to procedural justice probably messed -up the Düsseldorf meeting; as,
perhaps, did perceptions of interactional justice. All the while, the issue of distributive justice
seems to have had little or no impact on issues related to procedural and interactional justice
(undoubtedly because the principals were not on centre stage). 
In sum, we have evidence of a very complex set of interactions among forms of
justice occurring over the course of the negotiations. Failure to deal with perceptions of
unfairness in proposed ownership splits (distributive justice) appears to have been the
dominant reason why the negotiations failed, but issues related to procedural and
interactional justice may have provided a convenient rationale for not trying harder to deal
with the differences between the parties’ positions on the distribution of ownership in the IJV
between the two parties. The evidence is also such that at an interactional, or  procedural, or
distributive justice level this negotiation could have floundered. Our data provide additional
support for the findings of Skarlicki and Folger (1997) that three-way interactions of
perceptions of justice do help to explain retaliatory behavior, and in contexts involving the
actions of organizations (as represented by the actions of their agents). Our data suggest that
the tit-for-tat kinds of retaliatory behavior predicted by game theory (Axelrod, 1984) in
individual interactions, and supported by lab simulations, can also be found in the “real life”
behavior of organizations. 
Our data also suggest that the parties were aware of, and distinguished between,
unfairness at all three levels. In this case, the issues related to distributive justice reflect
organizational level phenomena. Some of the issues related to procedural justice were also
organizationally centered, but many related to implicit procedures that agents had informally
agreed to follow and whose breaches appear to have had more of an impact at the individual
level –on matters related to interactional justice. Because these two firms were, relatively
speaking, so much alike, we can only speculate on how fairness issues might play out at an
inter-organizational level in negotiations between large, experienced MNEs embedded in
different institutional settings. One thing does seem clear, however. The informal processes
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impact. The foregoing discussion leads us to conclude that:
Proposition 4a:  Violations of norms of procedural and/or interactional justice will give rise
to a complex set of retaliatory behavior producing further breaches of norms
of  procedural and  interactional justice. A negative spiral of increasing
perceptions of unfairness ultimately will lead to termination of negotiations.
The pace of deterioration is likely to be accelerated in the face of perceived
unfairness in distributive justice terms. 
Proposition 4b:  In early rounds of negotiations between firms, acts perceived as breaches of
procedural justice can be viewed as independent of acts perceived as
breaches of interactional justice. Perceptions of unfairness stemming from
either will increase the probability of negotiation failure.
Thus, the negotiations emerged in a way that made it much harder for the parties to
reach an agreement. The parties emerged from the Rosario meeting feeling that they had been
fair with each other, but largely in interactional terms. Important discrepancy gaps related to
procedural and distributive justice had been downplayed, if not ignored. In the intervening
six months these gaps slowly widen as a result of “sins” of omission by the principals and
sins of commission by the agents (Ariño, 2001). Although these “sins” lead to the parties
concluding that they will not deal with each other this time around, they are aware that they
may have to, or want to, deal with each other in the future and so they spend a significant
amount of time during the end game attempting to shorten the shadow of the future that their
actions have produced. The behaviors of the parties in this case lead us to suggest that:
Proposition 5a:  Principals’ failure to reach an agreement on distributive justice issues
throughout the negotiation process will eventually lead to alliance negotiation
failure. The effect will be stronger when perceptions of interactional justice
were primarily shaped by personal factors.
Proposition 5b:  When an alliance negotiation fails, the extent to which parties focus on
repairing their reputations is a positive function of the extent to which the
initial negotiation round was centered on interactional justice issues.
In retrospect, it is easy to make an argument that these parties were not meant for
each other. Objectively, LA did not have as much knowledge about, or access to, Latin
American markets as GP needed. Neither GP, nor LA, fought hard to make the deal happen.
And in the final analysis, both firms have survived in spite of not making the deal. Would
they have been better off with a deal? That, of course, is the $64,000 question. 
In addition to the ways that the parties dealt with fairness issues, four other elements
of the negotiations merit brief consideration. First, Ariño, de la Torre and Ring (2001) argue
that relational quality can be an important predictor of success (or failure) in an alliance. Two
ingredients of relational quality were present in our case. The initial conditions that existed
with the two firms produced an early positive increase in the level of relational quality. There
were many similarities between the founders and the firms. Their resources appeared to be
complementary. Cultural and language barriers were lower than average for a proposed IJV.
They came with good reputations, vouched for by a respected third party. And during the
very early stages of the negotiations in Rosario, they added to the “reservoir” of relational
quality brought to the table. As our data reveal, however, good relational quality does not
(and generally should not) trump what in the end will be a bad business deal.
27Second, much has been written about the role of interpersonal trust in alliances. Our
data shed some light on this important topic. We found evidence in the language used that GP
was acting with fairness in mind, and attempting to establish a basis for relying on
interpersonal trust. The parties were very open with each other and demonstrated a
willingness to be flexible. Wolfgang Knief indicated that what counted “is not only the
[business] model, but also the theme of personal chemistry. There has to be mutual trust,
otherwise it [the relationship] does not function. We did not want to bring a plan drawn up
too far in advance that later would not be flexible and able to fit to your instincts.” Gustavo
Rusco replied: “If it were not like this we would not be interested.” It was clear that both
sides were working to keep options open and to demonstrate that they were willing to be
flexible in their dealings with each other. The levels of inter-personal trust and relational
quality that surfaced during the two-day Rosario meeting appeared to have been sufficient to
prevent the parties from prematurely taking a positional bargaining approach to their
developing relationship. But this feeling of goodwill that emerged, in our view, also blinded
the parties to the discrepancy gap (Kumar and Nti, 1998) regarding the ownership split. 
Third, an ability to rely on a trusted third party does not guarantee success in
negotiations. Further, the fact that the principals to a negotiation develop interpersonal trust
in each other does not mean that their agents will have the same success. In addition, even
when the parties are able to develop some level of interpersonal trust in early stages of a
negotiation, it is likely to produce only fragile trust (Ring, 1996). As we have seen in our
case, that fragile trust can be damaged by relatively small matters, and destroyed by serious
breaches of either procedural or interactional justice.
Fourth, although beyond the scope of this paper, our data appear to provide clear
support for the important roles that the informal processes of sense making, understanding,
and committing described by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) play in shaping perceptions of
fairness. Thus, Blockner’s (2002) arguments on the role of sense making in understanding
how perceptions of fairness emerge and change merit more attention in both intra- and inter-
organizational settings.
Needless to say, generalizing from a single case –even if revelatory– is risky
business. We believe that our research demonstrates that it is possible, and worthwhile, to get
data on negotiations. Our data provide support for an argument that fairness can be a critical
element to the success of negotiations, and that all three forms of justice can be found at play.
We believe our data provide new insights into the debates on distributive and interactional
justice and support those who argue that distinguishing between the two is useful. Our data
also can be used to support an argument that fairness, relational quality and interpersonal
trust all play roles in negotiation outcomes, independently and in combination. We hope that
these initial efforts will encourage others to explore the conduct and processes of alliance
negotiations in more detail, relying on both qualitative and quantitative techniques in the
course of both inductive and deductive explorations of this important topic.
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32Appendix
Indicators of Fairness Derived from Justice Theories
• Distributive Justice
– Outcomes proportional to contributions (DJ1)
•P r ocedural Justice
–R epresentativeness – are the interests of the parties 
being addressed?  (PJ1)
– Explanation
–T imely feedback (PJ2)
– Using information for feedback (PJ3)
– Adequate justification for decisions (PJ4)
–E f fective two-way communication (open to challenging
/refuting each other’s views) (PJ5)
– Accuracy of information (PJ6)
– Full accounting (PJ7)
– Consistency of Approach (PJ8)
– Principals and agents are on the same page 





–E f fective two-way communication (IJ4)
– Bias suppression (IJ5)  
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